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MAYNARD v. CARTWRIGHT: HOW THE
SUPREME COURT KILLED THE CATCHALL
CATEGORY IN THE OKLAHOMA
DEATH PENALTY
I. INTRODUCTION
Hugh and Charma Riddle returned home on May 4, 1982, ate
supper, and began relaxing in front of the television.1 In another part of
the Riddles' Muskogee County, Oklahoma, home, William Thomas
Cartwright waited with a shotgun.2 Cartwright had been fired as an em-
ployee of the Riddles' remodeling business five months earlier; Cart-
wright had talked of revenge.3 Walking from the living room into a
hallway, Mrs. Riddle met with the intruder. Cartwright's revenge no
longer was just talk. Mrs. Riddle was shot in a struggle with Cart-
wright.5 Proceeding to the living room, Cartwright shot and killed Mr.
Riddle.6
A jury decided Cartwright deserved the death penalty for the mur-
der of Mr. Riddle. The murder, the jury concluded, belonged in a cate-
gory the Oklahoma death penalty statute reserves for the most horrible
murders:7 those that are "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel."' In
1985, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the jury that
Cartwright had committed what the statute describes as an "especially
heinous" murder.9 The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the
evidence considered as a whole satisfied the "especially heinous" stan-
dard." The Tenth Circuit in 1987 disagreed;" the appeals court decided
in Cartwright's case that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals had








8. See infra note 13.
9. Cartwright v. State, 695 P.2d 548, 553-54 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985), cert. denied, 473 U.S.
911 (1985).
10. Id. at 554.
11. Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477 (10th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 1853 (1988).
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given an unconstitutionally broad meaning to the words in the standard.
On June 6, 1988, the United State Supreme Court in Maynard v. Cart-
wright agreed that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals had not
given the five words a constitutionally specific definition."1
In technical terms, the "especially heinous" standard is an aggravat-
ing circumstance. In order to consider the death penalty in Oklahoma, a
judge or jury must decide that a murder or murderer is "especially
heinous" or satisfies one of the seven other statutory aggravating circum-
stances. 13 Aggravating circumstances are part of the sentencing pro-
cess' 4 that states have adopted to satisfy the Supreme Court that the
choice of which murderers are deserving of the death penalty can be
made in a non-discriminatory fashion. Aggravating circumstance is a
complicated way of describing a simple concept: in order to separate the
murders deserving of the death penalty from other murders, a jury must
find the presence of certain facts about the defendant or the crime before
being allowed to consider imposing the death sentence." The "especially
heinous" category has been described as the most controversial among
aggravating circumstances because of criticism that the vague language
does not actually function as a narrowing standard. 6 The Supreme
12. Maynard v. Cartwright, 108 S. Ct. 1853, 1857 (1988).
13. Generally, the Oklahoma death penalty is found at OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 701.7-.15 (1981
& Supp. 1987). Aggravating circumstances are found in § 701.12, which states:
Aggravating circumstances shall be:
1. The defendant was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of vio-
lence to the person;
2. The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person;
3. The person committed the murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration or
employed another to commit the murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration;
4. The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel;
5. The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest
or prosecution;
6. The murder was committed by a person while serving a sentence of imprisonment on
conviction of a felony;
7. The existence of a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of vio-
lence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; or
8. The victim of the murder was a peace officer as defined by Section 99 of Title 21 of the
Oklahoma Statutes, or guard of an institution under the control of the Department of
Corrections, and such person was killed while in performance of official duty.
Id. § 701.12.
14. Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 Sup. Cr. RFv. 305, 306. With many variations, the
process is: (1) a trial at which guilt or innocence is determined; (2) a penalty trial, during which
juries are required to balance or weigh aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances,
Id.
15. Rosen, The "Especially Heinous"Aggravating Circumstance in Capital Cases--The Standar.
dless Standard, 64 N.C.L. REv. 941 (1986).
16. Rosen, supra note 15, at 943-44. "These aggravating circumstances ... have generated
2
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Court has warned that the "especially heinous" type of aggravating cir-
cumstance may be unconstitutionally vague without guidelines from
state appellate courts - a warning sometimes not heeded.17 The prob-
lem with the term is that all murders arguably are especially heinous or
atrocious or cruel. 18 In contrast, other aggravating circumstances list
specific crimes or more precise factors about a defendant.1 9 States often
have not provided precise definitions of the broad language of the "espe-
cially heinous" type of standard.2" As a result, critics argue that the
standard does not serve the intended purpose of minimizing the chance
of arbitrary capital sentencing practices.2"
With a short opinion in June, 1988, the United States Supreme
Court used Cartwright's appeal to make one of its few statements about
how states must define the much-debated "especially heinous" standard.
In Maynard v. Cartwright,22 the Court for the most part agreed with the
Tenth Circuit and summarized previous death penalty policy statements.
Yet, the Cartwright decision clearly states that capital sentencing juries
must be given objective standards which are to be applied consistently by
state appellate courts. Cartwright indicates that the Supreme Court has
not changed its mind about the necessity of aggravating circumstances.
The Court continues to allow the use of vague statutory language to
more controversy than any other aggravating circumstance. Commentators have universally criti-
cized them as vague, overbroad, and meaningless." Id. (footnotes omitted). Weisburg's article pro-
vides another concise summary of the criticism of "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel":
The majority of the states, after listing such circumstances, conclude their lists with the
infamous aggravating circumstance that the murder was "especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel." Having attempted rule-like formality, these statutes then undermine their efforts
with this paradigmatic, anti-rule-like moral standard. On the authority of Godfrey v. Geor-
gia, the state courts must then haplessly try to restore the principle of legality by develop-
ing a common law of rule-like indicia to give shape to this remarkable provision.
Weisberg, supra note 14, at 333 (footnotes omitted).
17. Rosen, supra note 15, at 945.
18. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 255 (1976).
19. Weisberg, supra note 14, at 329:
Most of the common aggravating circumstances try to identify special indicia of
blameworthiness or dangerousness in the killing. Aside from the almost universal circum-
stance that the killing was committed in the course of another dangerous felony, which
significantly overlaps the felony murder rule, the common ones are that the murder was
committed for hire or for pecuniary gain, or for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a
lawful arrest or effecting an escape from lawful custody, or to disrupt or hinder the lawful
exercise of any government function or the enforcement of laws, or to conceal the commis-
sion of a crime or the identity of the perpetrator, or that the victim was either a witness to
the defendant's independent crime or a law enforcement officer engaged in the performance
of his duties.
... One might describe them in the aggregate as a model penal code of aggravation.
Id. at 329-30 (footnotes omitted).
20. Rosen, supra note 15, at 945.
21. Rosen, supra note 15, at 945.
22. 108 S. Ct. 1853 (1988).
3
Ward: Maynard v. Cartwright: How the Supreme Court Killed the Catchall
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1988
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
guide the discretion of sentencing juries provided that state appeals
courts supply more specific definitions.2a The Court implicitly warned
states not to use "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" as a catchall24
category for murders which do not fit into other more narrowly defined
aggravating circumstances.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
To the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, the facts as a whole
placed the murder of Riddle in the category for the most horrible
murders. The jury was not given a specific definition of especially hei-
nous. Instead, jurors concluded from the circumstances that the murder
had to be especially heinous. Likewise, the Court of Criminal Appeals
used all the facts to test whether the aggravating circumstance was ap-
plied constitutionally. The court's idea of a standard was a collection of
highlighted facts, including: the likelihood that Cartwright had been in
the Riddles' home earlier in the day to wait for them to return home; the
probability that Riddle had heard the shots which wounded his wife and
realized in terror his own fate; Cartwright's repeated attempts to kill
Mrs. Riddle; and Cartwright's efforts to conceal the crime. All the evi-
dence, the state appellate court decided, made the murder "especially
heinous. 25
For the standard it fashioned, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Ap-
peals found ample support in the crime at Hugh and Charma Riddle's
home. After she fell wounded in the hallway, Mrs. Riddle recognized
her assailant.26 Cartwright shot her a second time. Cartwright next
went to the living room. Cartwright fired two blasts; Riddle screamed,
then fell dead. With Cartwright out of sight, Mrs. Riddle dragged her-
self into a bedroom. Finding that the phone was not working, she started
writing on a bedsheet in blood. She completed six letters: "TOM
CAR."2 7
23. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 255-56 (1976). In Proffitt, the Court approved the statu-
tory language "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel," where defined by the Florida Supreme Court
as meaning murders involving torture. Id.
24. Harris v. State, 237 Ga. 718, 230 S.E.2d 1, 10 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977)
(Harris is one source of the often-quoted "catchall" term); Comment, The Death Penalty in Georgia:
An Aggravating Circumstance, 30 AM. U.L. REV. 835, 847 (1981).
25. Cartwright v. State, 695 P.2d 548, 554 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 911
(1985).
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When Cartwright found her in the bedroom, Mrs. Riddle asked him
to explain the shootings. Cartwright's answer was that he should not
have been fired.2" In response to Mrs. Riddle's plea for help, Cartwright
slashed her throat and stabbed her with a hunting knife which had been a
Christmas gift to him from the couple. Mrs. Riddle was, a court later
observed, miraculously still alive, although she became an amputee.29
Two days after Riddle was killed, the district attorney picked up
Cartwright at his sister's house.30 During questioning, Cartwright
confessed.31
Prosecutors urged the jury to find that three of the statutory aggra-
vating circumstances justified the death penalty. The state argued:
(1) that the defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to one or
more persons; (2) that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel; and (3) that a probability existed that the defendant would commit
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.32
The jury concluded that the first two aggravating circumstances were
present, but not the third.33
In the opinion from Cartwright's direct appeal, the Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals explained that it did not need to use a single stan-
dard to test the finding by the trial court that the murder was "especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel."'34 The court noted in the opinion that it
had not previously mandated a single definition such as the presence of
torture.35 The state court considered torture as just one term that could
be used to define the standard.36 The state appeals court explained that it
28. Id. Cartwright began working for the Riddles in July of 1981. Cartwright said he was fired
because he had demanded that the Riddles pay the expenses of an on-the-job injury; Mrs. Riddle
said he was laid off because of a lack of business. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 551. Cartwright called his sister from a pay telephone in Muskogee two days after
the shooting. She picked him up and pursuaded him to meet the Muskogee County District Attor-
ney. She then called the district attorney. Id.
31. Id. Cartwright's testimony was different. Cartwright testified that he had spoken with
Hugh Riddle on May 4 regarding his injury, and had been ordered to leave the property by Riddle.
Cartwright claimed that when he turned he was struck on the head. Cartwright claimed he
remembered nothing between May 4 and the call to his sister on May 6. At the trial, Cartwright said
he did not recall the excerpts read to him from the confession and was not aware he had been talking
to law enforcement officials. However, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded: "we are con-
vinced that the circumstances surrounding the appellant's interrogation indicate that he was coher-
ent, and doubtless knew that he was dealing with law enforcement officials." Id. at 552.
32. Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477, 1478 (10th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 1853 (1988).
33. Id.
34. Cartwright v. State, 695 P.2d 548, 553-54 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985), cert. denied, 473 U.S.
911 (1985).
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preferred an overall evidence test in order not to isolate the murder from
the related facts surrounding the crime.37
Cartwright's appeal soon was considered one of the fastest moving
on the Oklahoma death row.38 A state court in October, 1985, denied
Cartwright's application for post-conviction relief.3 9 Next, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma denied Cart-
wright's application for a writ of habeas corpus. In 1986, a three-judge
panel of Tenth Circuit justices affirmed the denial of Cartwright's appli-
cation for a writ of habeas corpus.' In early 1987, the entire Tenth Cir-
cuit court reviewed the issue of how the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals was applying the aggravating circumstance."' The Tenth Cir-
cuit decision was announced in June 1987: the "especially heinous, atro-
cious, or cruel" circumstance as applied by the Oklahoma court was
unconstitutionally broad.42 The court vacated Cartwright's sentence
without prejudice.
After having one of the more advanced appeals on its death row
vacated, the state petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ
of certiorari.43 On June 6, 1988, the Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth
Circuit decision in Cartwright's case.'
B. One Narrow Issue
At the Supreme Court, the question in the Cartwright appeal was
framed extremely narrowly: whether the Tenth Circuit correctly ruled
that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals had been interpreting the
"especially heinous" standard in an overly broad manner.4"
III. LAW PRIOR TO THE CASE
A. Development of Aggravating Circumstances
Aggravating circumstances was not a new idea when the term was
37. Id.
38. Ward, Time running out for 3 on death row, Tulsa Tribune, Jan. 9, 1987, at A-i, col. 1.
39. Cartwright v. State, 708 P.2d 592 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1073
(1986).
40. Cartwright v. Maynard, 802 F.2d 1203 (10th Cir. 1986).
41. Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477, 1478 (10th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 1853 (1988).
42. Id. at 1491.
43. Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477 (10th Cir. 1987),petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W.
3327 (U.S. Sept. 21, 1987) (No. 87-519), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 1853 (1988).
44. Maynard v. Cartwright, 108 S. Ct. 1853, 1860 (1988).
45. Id. at 1857.
[Vol. 24:215
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added to capital sentencing statutes in the late 1970's. Two decades ear-
lier, the drafters of the Model Penal Code had proposed a capital sen-
tencing scheme similar to the one later adopted by Oklahoma and other
states.46 Among the aggravating circumstances proposed in the Code:
"The murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting ex-
ceptional depravity."'47 The drafters of the Code urged the use of statu-
tory aggravating circumstances in capital sentencing statutes as a means
of controlling the discretion of judges and juries.4" The Code foreshad-
owed the coming debate over how successfully aggravating circum-
stances can be applied to make the imposition of capital punishment less
arbitrary. The drafters of the Code recognized that the goal would be
difficult to attain because the factors which determine whether death
sentences are appropriate cannot easily be written into simple formulas.49
After the Supreme Court began to revise its capital sentencing doc-
trine in the 1970's, aggravating circumstances became an important ele-
ment of state death penalties. In 1972, the Court in Furman v. Georgia50
held that the death penalty was being imposed by the states in a manner
which violated the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unu-
sual punishments." One of the Court's criticisms in Furman was that
capital sentencing statutes were not giving juries and judges enough gui-
dance for use in determining which crimes should be punished by
46. MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.6 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) (revised and approved in 1962 as
§ 210.6 of the Proposed Official Draft). The draft proposed a bifurcated trial with separate guilt and
sentencing proceedings. Under the proposal, a sentence of death could not be considered unless at
least one of the listed aggravating circumstances was proven. Id.
47. MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.6 (1962). The complete list:
(3) Aggravating circumstances.
(a) The murder was committed by a convict under sentence of imprisonment.
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another murder or of a felony or felonies
involving the use or threat of violence to the person.
(c) At the time the murder was committed the defendant also committed another murder
or murders.
(d) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.
(e) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged or was an accomplice in
the commission of, or the attempt to commit, or flight after committing robbery, rape by
force or intimidation, arson, burglary or kidnapping.
(f) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest
or effecting an escape from lawful custody.
(g) The murder was committed for hire or pecuniary gain.
(h) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional
depravity.
Id.
48. Id. at comment 3.
49. Id. § 201.6.
50. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
51. Id. at 239-40.
1988]
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death. 2 While the exact meaning of Furman as stated in nine separate
opinions is debatable,5 3 the Court often has emphasized the portion that
held open-ended discretion unconstitutional. 4 The result of Furman
was clearer. With capital punishment laws in 39 of 40 states invalidated
by Furman,5 states began rewriting their death penalties.
The death penalty statutes that states wrote after Furman can be
placed in two categories: guided discretion and mandatory. 6 States
which adopted the guided discretion approach provided sentencers with
statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances to use as guidelines
for determining whether to impose the death penalty.57 The mandatory
approach was supposed to eliminate arbitrariness in the death penalty by.
eliminating discretion. 8 Under the mandatory laws, death was the auto-
matic sentence for certain crimes.5 9 On July 2, 1976, the Supreme Court
ruled that guided discretion statutes were constitutional, but that
mandatory death penalty laws were unconstitutional.6 0 Four days later,
52. Maynard v. Cartwright, 108 S. Ct. 1853, 1858 (1988).
53. Weisberg, supra note 14, at 315-17. The author described the difficulty in gleaning a clear
meaning from Furman:
It is not so much a case as a badly orchestrated opera, with nine characters taking turns to
offer their own arias....
In the manner of literary criticism, one can extract unifying "themes" in the Furman
opinions, such as the dangers of arbitrariness and discrimination, which support later deci-
sions to impose specific formal constraints on the penalty trial. But because there really is
no doctrinal holding in Furman, it has not logically impeded the Court from later claiming
that it has never tried to impose such constraints.
Weisberg, supra note 14, at 315-17; See also Special Project, Capital Punishment in 1984: Aban-
doning the Pursuit of Fairness and Consistency, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1129, 1141-42 (1984): "It is
difficult to derive a constitutional standard from the decision because the five Justices who voted in
Furman to strike down the Georgia and Texas statutes could not agree on a basis for the judgment."
Id.; See Rosen, supra note 15, at 946-47. A summary of the Furman opinions: Among the 5-4
majority, there were five concurring opinions. "Justices Brennan and Marshall found the death
penalty was a per se violation of the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause, but
Justices Douglas, Stewart and White held only that capital punishment imposed at the complete
discretion of the sentencer violates the eighth amendment." Rosen, supra note 15, at 946-47 (foot-
note omitted). Douglas wrote of the potential for racial and economic discrimination in the capital
sentencing statutes then in effect. Stewart decried the lack of standards to overcome arbitrariness.
White wrote that the death penalty was imposed in so few cases that there was no meaningful way to
distinguish the cases in which it was being imposed from those in which it was not. Rosen, supra
note 15, at 946-47.
54. Maynard v. Cartwright, 108 S. Ct. 1853, 1858 (1988).
55. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 417 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell noted
that only the mandatory death sentence for life term inmates in Rhode Island escaped Furman. Id.
56. Special Project, supra note 53, at 1147.
57. Special Project, supra note 53, at 1147.
58. Special Project, supra note 53, at 1147.
59. Special Project, supra note 53, at 1147.
60. Guided discretion statutes were reviewed in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt
8
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the Oklahoma mandatory capital sentencing law was voided.61 Within
days, a guided discretion statute was in effect in Oklahoma.62
In the first review of the "especially heinous" type of aggravating
circumstance,63 the Supreme Court expressed doubts that vague terms
performed the intended function of guiding the discretion of sentencing
juries. In Gregg v. Georgia,'4 the Supreme Court examined a Georgia
aggravating circumstance which described a category of murder as "out-
rageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved tor-
ture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim."' 65 The
Court decided that a state appellate court could make the broad term
constitutional by applying a more specific definition. 66 In Proffitt v. Flor-
ida, one of the aggravating circumstances at issue was "especially hei-
nous, atrocious, or cruel.",67 Again, the Court ruled that a state appellate
court could adequately define the standard as applying only to crimes
involving torture.68
B. Godfrey v. Georgia
In Cartwright, the Supreme Court revisited a 1980 decision, Godfrey
v. Georgia.69 In Godfrey, the Court was asked whether a state supreme
court had interpreted an aggravating circumstance similar to the "espe-
cially heinous" standard in an overly broad manner. As in Cartwright,
v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). Mandatory capital sen-
tencing laws were ruled unconstitutional in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) and
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
61. The mandatory death penalty in Oklahoma was held to be cruel and unusual punishment.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the death sentences, and remanded the following
cases to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in the following orders: Green v. Oklahoma, 428
U.S. 907 (1976); Justus v. Oklahoma, 428 U.S. 907 (1976); Lusty v. Oklahoma, 428 U.S. 907 (1976);
Davis v. Oklahoma, 428 U.S. 907 (1976); Rowbotham v. Oklahoma, 428 U.S. 907 (1976); and Wil-
liams v. Oklahoma, 428 U.S. 907 (1976).
62. The new law took effect at 12:01 a.m. on July 24, 1976. State replaces nullified death law,
Tulsa Tribune, July 24, 1976, at 1, col. 1. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 701.7-.15 (1981 & Supp. 1987)
(effective July 24, 1976).
63. Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477, 1486 (10th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 1853 (1988).
The Supreme Court first addressed the aggravating circumstance in 1976 in Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976), and Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
64. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
65. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (b)(7) (1982). See also Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477,
1486 (10th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 1853 (1988).
66. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 201.
67. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 255 (1976); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(h) (West 1985).
See also Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477, 1486 (10th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 1853 (1988).
68. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 255-56 (1976). See also Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d
1477, 1486 (10th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 1853 (1988).
69. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
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the state appellate court in Godfrey concluded that categorizing the sen-
tence under a worst-murder standard was justified by the facts of the
crime.
In early September, 1977, Robert Franklin Godfrey's unhappy mar-
riage was ending in divorce.70 Godfrey thought his mother-in-law was
trying to break up the marriage.71 Following a heated phone conversa-
tion with his wife, Godfrey armed himself with a shotgun and went to his
mother-in-law's trailer.72 Through a window, he could see his mother-
in-law, his wife, and his 11-year-old daughter playing cards.73 Godfrey
aimed the shotgun and fired. The shot hit his wife in the forehead.74
Entering the trailer, Godfrey shot his mother-in-law in the head." God-
frey said later, "I've done a hideous crime,... but I have been thinking
about it for eight years ... I'd do it again."76
The Georgia Supreme Court previously had defined the aggravating
circumstance by using three criteria including torture, a depraved mind,
or aggravated battery.77 At the sentencing phase of Godfrey's trial, the
prosecutor stated that torture and aggravated battery were not in-
volved.78 Nonetheless, the jury decided the aggravating circumstance
was present.79 Affirming the sentence, the Georgia Supreme Court de-
cided-as did the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in Cartwright-
that the jury's finding of aggravating circumstance was valid based on the
overall evidence.8 0
While the Godfrey decision focused on the standard which a state
court must apply to make a broadly worded aggravating circumstance
constitutional, the message was unclear. The decision was fashioned af-
ter already familiar statements of Court policy governing vaguely worded
aggravating circumstances. In Godfrey, the Court found an aggravating
circumstance which did not satisfy its requirements of a true limiting
definition. 8' One of the Court's now-familiar observations was that the
70. Id. at 424.





76. Id. at 426.
77. See generally id. at 429-33.
78. Id. at 426.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 427.
81. Id. at 428.
[Vol. 24:215
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words "outrageously or wantonly vile" could describe almost any mur-
der.82 The Court decided that Godfrey's sentences were unconstitutional
because the Georgia Supreme Court had failed to use a narrowing defini-
tion to ensure that the aggravating circumstance had been properly
used.83 One interpretation contends that Godfrey signaled state appellate
courts to apply definitions of aggravating circumstances such as "espe-
cially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" in a consistent manner.84
C. The Oklahoma Version of the Standard
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals first interpreted the ag-
gravating circumstance in Eddings v. State" in March, 1980, approxi-
mately two months before Godfrey was announced. Eddings, a 16-year-
old runaway from his home in Missouri, shot and killed an Oklahoma
Highway Patrol trooper who had stopped him on the Turner Turnpike.86
The trial court found that the murder was "especially heinous."8" Ed-
dings argued that the murder of the trooper was no more heinous, atro-
cious, or cruel than any murder.88 The Court of Criminal Appeals
acknowledged Supreme Court policy by stating that the category was
intended to include out-of-the-ordinary killings.89 The court adopted the
definition of especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel used by the Florida
Supreme Court and approved by the United States Supreme Court in
Proffitt. ° The Florida court had defined the words in the phrase sepa-
rately. Heinous was defined as "extremely wicked or shockingly evil."'"
Atrocious was defined as meaning "outrageously wicked and vile."92
82. Id. at 428-29.
83. Id. at 432-34. "There is no principled way to distinguish this case, in which the death
penalty was imposed, from the many cases in which it was not." Id. at 433.
84. Rosen, supra note 15, at 965.
85. 616 P.2d 1159 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
86. Id. at 1162-63. Eddings had taken his brother's car and had run away with two friends and
his sister. In addition, Eddings had taken three of his father's firearms and had shortened the barrel
of a .410 gauge shotgun. On the turnpike, Eddings lost control of the car briefly when he dropped a
cigarette. A man reported to Patrolman Larry Crabtree that he saw the car swerve into a ditch.
After being stopped by Crabtree, Eddings loaded the shotgun. As the trooper approached the car,
Eddings pointed the shotgun out the window and fired. Id.
87. Id. at 1167. The trial court also found that the murder was committed "for the purpose of
avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution," and that Eddings would "constitute a contin-
uing threat to society." Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477, 1487 (10th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 1853 (1988).
91. Eddings v. State, 616 P.2d 1159, 1167 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980) (quoting State v. Dixon, 283
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Cruel was defined as "designed to inflict a high degree of pain with utter
indifference to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of others."93 The
Oklahoma court's view was that under the borrowed definition, the
crimes intended to be included were those which could be set apart from
other capital felonies - as conscienceless or pitiless crimes which are
"unnecessarily torturous to the victim."9" The Oklahoma court con-
cluded that the killing of an on-duty police officer satisfied the stan-
dard.9 5 Even in Eddings, the Supreme Court expressed doubts that the
standard had been used properly by the Court of Criminal Appeals.96
The Court of Criminal Appeals did not interpret Godfrey as requir-
ing a mandatory standard. By the time the Court of Criminal Appeals
reviewed Cartwright's conviction, it had abandoned its Eddings stan-
dard. In several cases, the state court followed the definition in Ed-
dings97 but did not make the narrower definition mandatory. 98 In some
cases, the Court of Criminal Appeals specifically rejected the idea that
the murders must involve torture if they are to qualify as "especially
heinous."99 In Cartwright's direct appeal, the state appellate court de-
scribed torture as just one acceptable definition of "especially hei-
nous."' For a standard in Cartwright, the state appellate court used all
the key evidence of the murder.101 Cartwright had urged the Court of
Appeals to find that the murder of Riddle was not "especially heinous"
because of the absence of torture.10 2 The state appeals court responded
by distinguishing Godfrey.t°3 The Court of Criminal Appeals noted that
unlike the Georgia Supreme Court, it had not made torture a mandatory
93. Id. at 1167-68.
94. Id. at 1168.
95. Id.
96. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 109 n.4 (1982) states:
We understand the Court of Criminal Appeals to hold that the murder of a police officer in
the performance of his duties is "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" under the Oklahoma statute
.... However, we doubt that the trial judge's understanding and application of this aggra-
vating circumstance conformed to that degree of certainty required by our decision in God.
frey v. Georgia ....
Id.; In a footnote the court slated that the trial judge had found the crime was heinous, atrocious, or
cruel because it was "designed to inflict a high degree of pain ... in utter indifference to the rights
of Patrolman Crabtree." Id. at 108 n.3.
97. Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477, 1487 (10th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 1853 (1988).
98. Id. at 1488.
99. Id.; Irvin v. State, 617 P.2d 588, 598-99 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980).
100. Cartwright v. State, 695 P.2d 548, 554 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985), cerl. denied, 473 U.S. 911
(1985).
101. Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477, 1489 (10th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 1853 (1988).
102. Cartwright v. State, 695 P.2d 548, 553-54 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980), cert. denied, 473 U.S.
911 (1985).
103. Id. at 554.
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requirement for a finding of "especially heinous."' 1 4
Soon, Oklahoma had an assortment of "especially heinous" stan-
dards. The Tenth Circuit found the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Ap-
peals had used: definitions of the terms heinous, atrocious and cruel; the
manner of the killing; a killer's attitude; the suffering of the victim; and,
as in Cartwright, all of the circumstances surrounding the murder.1"5
As a kind of "Godfrey II," Cartwright went to the Supreme Court.
In each case, the state courts had approved the finding of the aggravating
circumstance based on the overall facts of the crime.' 06 The Tenth Cir-
cuit found a significant difference between the cases. The Georgia
Supreme Court in Godfrey failed to consistently apply an established
standard.107 In Oklahoma, no standard existed which satisfied constitu-
tional requirements. 08 Because of the similarities and differences in the
issues of Cartwright and Godfrey, and because of the adherence to God-
frey by the Tenth Circuit, the appeal gave the Supreme Court an oppor-
tunity to follow, explain, or overturn Godfrey.
IV. THE CARTWRIGHT DECISION (OR "GODFREY Ir')
In Maynard v. Cartwright, the Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth
Circuit ruling in Cartwright's appeal; indirectly, the Court announced
that Godfrey remained part of its capital sentencing policy on aggravat-
ing circumstances. In the unanimous decision, 109 the Court (1) found in
Cartwright a case similar to Godfrey; (2) rejected the argument that
murders can be distinguished as "especially heinous" by juries without
further guidance; and (3) refused to make torture and physical abuse a
mandatory definition of the "especially heinous" standard. The Court,
however, did not give any guidelines as to what other definitions would
satisfy constitutional requirements.
As interpreted through Cartwright, Godfrey becomes a clearer state-
ment by the Court that the eighth amendment requires that sentencing
104. Id.
105. Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477, 1491 (10th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 1853 (1988).
106. Id. In Cartwright, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the overall
circumstances "adequately supported" the finding that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious,
or cruel. Cartwright v. State, 695 P.2d 548, 554 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 911
(1985). The appeals court noted "[t]his conclusion is no different than the finding that the verdict
was 'factually substantiated' that was held inadequate in Godfrey." Cartwright v. Maynard, 822
F.2d 1477, 1491 (10th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 1853 (1988) (citations omitted).
107. Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477, 1492 (10th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 1853 (1988).
108. Id.
109. Maynard v. Cartwright, 108 S. Ct. 1853 (1988).
1988]
13
Ward: Maynard v. Cartwright: How the Supreme Court Killed the Catchall
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1988
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
discretion under the "especially heinous" standard be limited by objec-
tive and consistently applied standards. The Court rejected Oklahoma's
argument that the language in the statute was not unconstitutionally
vague. " 0 The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits
vague statutes. 11 Since Furman, the Supreme Court has required that
capital sentencing laws satisfy the interrelated" 12 concepts of due pro-
cess1 3 and the requirements that the discretion of sentencers be guided
under the eighth amendment.11 4 In Cartwright, the state argued that
some murders are so obviously "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel"
that they do not need to be weighed by appellate courts against an objec-
tive standard." 5 The Court replied that claims of vagueness regarding
aggravating circumstances are analyzed only under the eighth amend-
ment.'1 6 The rationale of Godfrey was unclear. The murders in Godfrey
took place in a domestic context. One way to read Godfrey is that the
Court did not think the facts warranted the death penalty. But, the Cart-
wright Court interpreted Godfrey as applying the eighth amendment
principle that limiting the sentencers' discretion in imposing the death
penalty is a fundamental constitutional requirement.'" 7
The Supreme Court agreed with the Tenth Circuit analysis that
Cartwright presented the same problems addressed in Godfrey. The
Court agreed with the Tenth Circuit that the Oklahoma aggravating cir-
cumstance gave inadequate guidance to sentencers."18 The Court disre-
garded the argument made by the state that the addition of the word
110. Id. at 1857-58. The Court stated:
As we understand the argument, it is that a statutory provision governing a criminal case is
unconstitutionally vague only if there are no circumstances that could be said with reason-
able certainty to fall within reach of the language at issue. Or to put it another way, that if
there are circumstances that any reasonable person would recognize as covered by the
statute, it is not unconstitutionally vague even if the language would fail to give adequate
notice that it covered other circumstances as well.
Id. at 1857.
Ill. Rosen, supra note 15, at 954.
112. Rosen, supra note 15, at 954. Rosen states:
Both doctrines operate under the assumption that the legislature has the power to legislate
in a given area but can only do so in a way that protects a defendant from ad hoc, standar-
dless decision making by judges and juries. It is clear that if an aggravating circumstance
cannot survive the tests of the due process vagueness doctrine, then it cannot perform the
role allotted to it by the eighth amendment.
Rosen, supra note 15, at 959.
113. Rosen, supra note 15, at 956.
114. Rosen, supra note 15, at 959.
115. Maynard v. Cartwright, 108 S. Ct. 1853, 1857 (1988).
116. Id. at 1857-58.
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"especially" gave the necessary guidance to juries." 9 The Court found
that, like the Georgia Supreme Court in Godfrey, the Court of Criminal
Appeals had used the facts of the murder to support the finding of the
aggravating circumstance.12 0 The Court said the Oklahoma court's deci-
sion in Cartwright could not be distinguished from Godfrey. 2'
The Court explained that torture or physical abuse is not the only
acceptable definition of "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel."' 22 The
State of Oklahoma had the same view of the Tenth Circuit ruling in Cart-
wright that Justice Burger had of the ruling in Godfrey. As Burger com-
plained in Godfrey,'23 the state argued that the appeals court opinion
could be interpreted as limiting "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel"
to cases where the victim has suffered physical abuse. 124 In Cartwright,
Justice White wrote that the Court was not requiring some sort of torture
or serious physical abuse as the only acceptable definition. 25
The Court declined to examine the issue of whether a death penalty
should stand where at least one aggravating circumstance found by the
sentencer remains unchallenged after others are found invalid. 26 At the
time Cartwright was decided by the Tenth Circuit, the policy of the
Court of Criminal Appeals required that a death penalty be reduced to a
life sentence when an aggravating circumstance was found invalid, even
if other valid aggravating circumstances remained. 127 In Oklahoma, the
sentencer is required to balance the statutory aggravating circumstances
119. Id. "To say something is 'especially heinous' merely suggests that the individual jurors
should determine that the murder is more than just 'heinous,' whatever that means, and an ordinary
person could honestly believe that every unjustified, intentional taking of human life is 'especially




123. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 443 (1980) (Burger, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger
stated:
ETihe plurality appears to require "evidence of serious physical abuse" before a death sen-
tence can be imposed under § (b)(7).... The plurality's novel physical torture requirement
may provide an "objective" criterion, but it hardly separates those for whom a state may
prescribe the death sentence from those for whom it may not.
Id. (citation omitted).
124. Brief of Petitioners at 37, Maynard v. Cartwright, 108 S. Ct. 1853 (1988) (No. 87-519).
125. Maynard v. Cartwright, 108 S. Ct. 1853, 1859 (1988). Justice White stated:
We do not, however, agree that the Court of Appeals imposed this requirement. It noted
cases in which such a requirement sufficed to validate an otherwise vague aggravating cir-
cumstance, but it expressly refrained from directing the State to adopt any specific curative
construction of the aggravating circumstance at issue here.
Id.
126. Id. at 1860.
127. Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477, 1481 (10th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 1853 (1988).
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with any mitigating circumstances presented by the defendant. 28 Imme-
diately after the Tenth Circuit court ruling in Cartwright, the Court of
Criminal Appeals reversed its policy against reweighing. 29 The
Supreme Court refused to comment on the possible effects of the
Oklahoma reweighing guidelines on Cartwright.3 '
Justice White, the author of the Cartwright opinion, 13' was a dis-
senter in Godfrey.132 White, who along with Justice Rehnquist had been
concerned that the Court was ignoring the circumstances of the
murders, 133 wrote that the Court's proper role was to correct genuine
constitutional errors, not to second-guess the interpretation of facts
which reasonably satisfied the statutory language. 134 The Court's role,
White wrote, was not to interfere with factfinders in state criminal cases
absent a constitutional violation. 135 Because White was not convinced
that a constitutional violation had arisen, he was willing to apply the
Court's standard which would not disturb the sentence if a rational basis
appeared to exist for the aggravating circumstance. 136 When the state of
Oklahoma raised the same argument in Cartwright, Oklahoma found it
no longer had the same two votes on the Court.
V. ANALYSIS
A. Godfrey Becomes Unanimous
The unanimous opinion in Cartwright states policy more forcefully
than the plurality opinion in Godfrey, although no new law was an-
nounced. The Supreme Court did not use the opportunity to further de-
fine how states must test broadly worded aggravating circumstances such
as the especially heinous standard. While the Court stated clearly that
torture is not a required definition, it did not elaborate on how states
must write standards. As a result, Cartwright stands as an action by the
128. Id. at 1480-82.
129. Stouffer v. State, 742 P.2d 562, 564 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 763
(1988).
130. Maynard v. Cartwright, 108 S. Ct. 1853, 1860 (1988).
131. Id. at 1856. Justice White delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. Id. Justice Bren-
nan filed a one-paragraph concurring opinion, in which Justice Marshall joined. Brennan restated
his view that the death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 1860 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
132. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 444 (1980) (White, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 446-47. Rehnquist had joined in White's dissent in Godfrey.
134. Id. at 450. White wondered, "Who is to say that the murders of Mrs. Godfrey and Mrs.
Wilkerson were not 'vile,' or 'inhuman,' or 'horrible'?" Id.
135. Id. at 451.
136. Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 313 (1979)).
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Court to enforce past policy. Writers have complained that no clear pol-
icy emerged from Godfrey, 137 in part because a majority did not agree on
an opinion. 38 The Court did not return to the issue of how states must
define the "especially henious" aggravating circumstance until Cart-
wright.'39 If Godfrey could be described as an opinion which applies
established sentencing policy rather than making new law,"4° then Cart-
wright might best be described as an opinion which demonstrates the
Court was not ready to re-examine those overall principles. Some states,
including Oklahoma, had not adopted and applied adequate constitu-
tional standards to define the "especially heinous" type of aggravating
circumstance.1 4
1
B. The Court Clarifies Godfrey
In response to the complaint of the State of Oklahoma that the
Tenth Circuit had required that the "especially heinous" aggravating cir-
cumstance be applied only where torture or serious physical abuse was
found, the Supreme Court clarified Godfrey. In his dissent to Godfrey,
former Chief Justice Burger wrote about the plurality's "novel physical
torture requirement."' 42 The plurality, Burger wrote, appeared to re-
quire evidence of torture or serious physical abuse as a prerequisite to
approving a sentence under the "especially heinous" type of aggravating
circumstance in effect in Georgia.' 43 In Cartwright, the Court specifi-
cally stated that a form of torture or serious physical abuse is not the
only narrowing standard of the "especially heinous" type of aggravating
circumstance that would pass constitutional examination.'"
The Supreme Court did not elaborate on what definitions of the "es-
pecially heinous" type of aggravating circumstance would satisfy consti-
tutional requirements. States may continue to write the definitions under
137. Donohue, Godfrey v. Georgia: Creative Federalism, The Eighth Amendment, and the
Evolving Law of Death, 30 CATH. U.L. R v. 13, 23-24 (1980); See also Rosen, supra note 15, at 964.
138. Donohue, supra note 137, at 17.
139. Brief of Respondent at 13, Maynard v. Cartwright, 108 S. Ct. 1853 (1988) (No. 87-519).
140. Rosen, supra note 15, at 964.
141. Rosen, supra note 15, at 965.
142. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 443 (1980).
143. Id.
144. Maynard v. Cartwright, 108 S. Ct. 1853, 1859-60 (1988). The Court also expressly dis-
agreed with the State of Oklahoma's assertion that torture or serious physical abuse has been re-
quired by the Court of Appeals. IdL at 1859.
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broad guidelines that prohibit only vague definitions. 145 Cartwright indi-
rectly adds the requirement that the definitions must be mandatory. 146
The Tenth Circuit also had refused to offer additional guidelines for Stan-
dard-writing, noting that the Supreme Court had declined to do so when
given the opportunity. 47 The Tenth Circuit observed that the Supreme
Court view has been that states should determine the relevant factors to
be used in the standards. 148
One possible explanation of the brevity of the Cartwright decision is
that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals had conceded before the
Supreme Court ruling that its interpretation of Godfrey was wrong. Cu-
riously, one indication given by the Supreme Court for accepting Cart-
wright was the conflict between the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals and the Tenth Circuit.1 49 By the time Cartwright reached the
Supreme Court, there was no conflict. The other explanation the Court
gave for hearing the case remained: it wanted to address the important
constitutional issue involved.15 Cartwright left the Court mainly with
the choice to agree or disagree with the Tenth Circuit interpretation of
Godfrey.
C. Oklahoma Defines the New Torture and Physical Abuse Standard
When the Supreme Court announced the Cartwright decision on
June 6, 1988, the appeal had been affecting the "especially heinous" stan-
dard in Oklahoma for almost a year. The Court of Criminal Appeals, on
July 31, 1987, made two policy changes as a result of the Tenth Circuit
ruling in Cartwright v. Maynard.' First, the Court of Criminal Appeals
in Stouffer v. State defined "especially heinous" murders as only those in
which death follows torture or serious physical abuse.'52 Second, the
state appellate court ended a policy under which it reduced death
sentences to life sentences when any of the aggravating circumstances
were ruled invalid on appeal.15 3
In the cases since the Tenth Circuit ruling in Cartwright v. Maynard,
the Court of Criminal Appeals has been defining what will be required to
145. Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477, 1492 (10th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 1853 (1988).
146. See Maynard v. Cartwright, 108 S. Ct. 1853, 1857-58 (1988).
147. Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477, 1492 (10th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 1853 (1988).
148. Id. (quoting California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 999 (1983)).
149. Maynard v. Cartwright, 108 S. Ct. 1853, 1857 (1988).
150. Id.
151. Stouffer v. State, 742 P.2d 562 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 763 (1988).
152. Id. at 563.
153. Id. at 564.
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satisfy the torture or serious physical abuse standard. A clear test could
emerge eventually, or the Court of Criminal Appeals could weigh the
facts of each case without writing a rigid definition.
With Stouffer, the Court of Criminal Appeals began the process of
defining torture and serious physical abuse by looking for evidence of
physical suffering. The Court of Criminal Appeals decided in Stouffer
that no torture or physical abuse was present in a case in which the mur-
der victim was shot twice in the head and died within minutes. 54 To
explain its decision, the state court pointed to the lack of evidence that
the victim was conscious after the first shot. 55 The court upheld
Stouffer's death sentence based on two additional aggravating circum-
stances. The "Stouffer standard" focused on the victim's condition after
the fatal wounds were inflicted.'5 6
In Mann v. State, 157 the Court of Criminal Appeals decided that
prolonged, painful abuse before the fatal wounds were inflicted satisfied
the torture or physical abuse test. Mann's sentence was based on the
"especially heinous" standard alone. The state appellate court found
that the standard was satisfied because the physical abuse resulted in se-
vere pain and fright before death.'58 The victim was abducted, beaten,
slashed, and shot in the head and chest.' 5 9 There was also evidence that
the victim was told he was to be killed. 6 In Mann, awareness of im-
pending death - fright - was one factor which the court considered in
finding extreme or serious physical abuse. 6
Serious bullet wounds inflicted an undetermined period before death
supported the new requirement in Hale v. State.'62 The victim of an ex-
tortion was observed badly wounded and was heard crying for help a day
before his body was found. 6 a The victim had been shot five times: two
shots to the head were ruled to have been fatal. A wound to the abdo-
men was ruled potentially fatal. There also were wounds to an arm and a
leg.'14 Though the time of death was uncertain, the Court was satisfied
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Brief of Respondent at 41-42, Maynard v. Cartwright, 108 S. Ct. 1853 (1988) (No. 87-519).
157. 749 P.2d. 1151 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988).
158. Id. at 1160.
159. Id. at, 1154.
160. Id. at 1160.
161. Id.
162. 750 P.2d 130 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988).




Ward: Maynard v. Cartwright: How the Supreme Court Killed the Catchall
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1988
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
that the victim had suffered while conscious with serious wounds. 165
Rape is another type of physical abuse and injury which may satisfy
the new definition. In Rojem v. State,166 a seven-year-old girl died from
two large stab wounds to the neck region. 167 She had been injured in the
vaginal area. 161 The evidence indicated the rape had occurred before
death. The court decided there was no question that the rape and related
injuries were painful.'69 The Court did not discuss the issue of con-
sciousness during the physical abuse before death.
In Brown v. State, 70 the state appellate court found that the murder
was not "especially heinous" because the evidence was unclear as to
when fatal wounds were inflicted. Among several gunshot wounds, two
were to the victim's heart and aorta. 7 1 There was testimony that the
two chest wounds would have resulted in a rapid death.172 Investigators
theorized that the victim had been shot several times before her car
crashed, then again after the wreck.' 73 But, the Court of Criminal Ap-
peals ruled the standard was not satisfied because the point at which the
fatal shots were fired was uncertain. 74
The first applications of the new standard show the Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals generally has required evidence of conscious pain before
death. Fright has been taken into consideration when accompanied by
physical injuries. Beating, stabbing, gunshot wounds, and rape have also
satisfied the definition.
D. After Cartwright
For Oklahoma, most of the impact of William Thomas Cartwright's
appeal took place almost a year before the Supreme Court considered the
case. The Court of Criminal Appeals already was writing and applying a
new torture or serious physical abuse test to comply with the Tenth Cir-
cuit interpretation of Godfrey. For other states which have been applying
the "especially heinous" type standard in the same manner as Oklahoma,
Cartwright means that juries no longer may use standards based on the
165. Id.
166. 753 P.2d 359 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988).
167. Id. at 362.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 369.
170. 753 P.2d 908 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988).
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facts of a murder. For Cartwright, a death sentence could become a life
sentence. 175
The Supreme Court quickly applied its ruling in Cartwright to inval-
idate four death sentences: two more in Oklahoma appeals, 176 one in
Arizona, 177 and one in Mississippi.1 78 In applying its statutory standard
for murders described as "especially heinous, cruel, or depraved," the
Arizona Supreme Court has used a broad definition comparable to the
one used in Oklahoma. 179 The Mississippi Supreme Court has affirmed
some findings of its "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating
circumstance without using a standard. 180
The death row appeals most likely to result in life sentences as a
result of Cartwright are those in which "especially heinous" was the sole
aggravating circumstance, and in which the juries were not given the tor-
ture or serious physical abuse instruction. Kirk Wayne Brogie's death
sentence was the first to be reduced to life as a result of Cartwright.8'
Brogie and three passengers in a car stopped on Interstate 40 in
Oklahoma City in August, 1979, when they saw a woman stranded be-
cause of a flat tire.18 2 The woman thought she was being driven home.183
Instead, she was threatened at knife point, undressed, robbed, sexually
assaulted, and stabbed.' 8 4  Brogie participated in the repeated stab-
bings," s5 then ordered the others to drag the seriously wounded woman
into the weeds along a roadside.' 86 Two of Brogie's companions hit her
in the head with a piece of asphalt.'1 7 In affirming Brogie's sentence in
175. Interview with Mandy Welch, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Cartwright's appellate
attorney (Sept. 22, 1988). Welch believes the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals must modify
Cartwright's sentence to life imprisonment. Id.; Interview with Susan Stewart Dickerson, Assistant
Attorney General, chief of criminal division (Sept. 23, 1988). The state has asked the Court of
Criminal Appeals to reinstate the death penalty by reweighing the aggravating circumstances. Id.
176. Stout v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2814 (1988), vacating Stout v. State, 693 P.2d 617 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1985); Hayes v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2815 (1988), vacating Hayes v. State, 738 P.2d 533
(Okla. Crim. App. 1987).
177. Woratzeck v. Ricketts, 108 S. Ct. 2815 (1988), vacating 820 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1987).
178. Jones v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 2891 (1988), vacating Jones v. State, 517 So. 2d 1295 (Miss.
1987).
179. Rosen, supra note 15, at 980.
180. Rosen, supra note 15, at 984. See also Washington v. State, 361 So. 2d 61, 65-66 (Miss.
1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 916 (1979). The court wrote that it believes the average jury under-
stands the words and is able to apply the standard without further definition. Id.
181. Brogie v. State, 760 P.2d 1316 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988).
182. Brogie v. State, 695 P.2d 538, 541 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 542.
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1985, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the evidence sup-
ported the aggravating circumstance. 188  The state court modified
Brogie's sentence to life two months after Cartwright was announced.18 9
The jury at Brogie's trial was given the same instruction about the mean-
ing of "especially heinous" as was the Cartwright jury.190 In the terse
order, the Court of Criminal Appeals explained that because the jury had
not been instructed that "especially heinous" murders involve torture or
serious physical abuse, it was required under Cartwright to modify the
sentence. 191
Cartwright may not signal the end of the catchall aggravating cir-
cumstance. Another possible catchall aggravating circumstance asks the
jury whether the killer will threaten society in the future.1 92 The State of
Oklahoma argued in Cartwright that the "continuing threat" standard,
which the Court had previously approved, was even more vague than the
"especially heinous" standard. 193
Cartwright does not resolve the issue of whether standards supplied
by an appellate court should be substituted for the lack of adequate nar-
rowing guidelines given to juries. The Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instruc-
tions direct the "especially heinous" standard to murders which are
preceded by torture or serious physical abuse.1 94  However, the instruc-
tion does not require that "especially heinous" be found by a jury only
where evidence of torture or serious physical abuse exists. The wording
of the jury instruction under the new state torture or physical abuse re-
quirement creates the possibility of new challenges to the "especially hei-
nous" aggravating circumstance. The Supreme Court then would likely
be asked to resolve the issue of whether a standard designed to guide
sentencers' discretion can be applied constitutionally at the appellate
level.
188. Id.
189. Brogie v. State, 760 P.2d 1316 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988).
190. Id.; Brief of Respondent at 3, Maynard v. Cartwright, 108 S. Ct. 1853 (1988)(No. 87-519).
The following instruction was given at Cartwright's trial; "[a]s used in these instructions, the term
'heinous' means extremely wicked or shockingly evil, 'atrocious' means outrageously wicked and
vile, 'cruel' means pitiless, or designed to inflict a high degree of pain, utter indifference to, or enjoy-
ment of, the sufferings of others." Id.
191. Brogie, 760 P.2d at 1316.
192. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.12 (1981 & Supp. 1987).
193. Brief of Petitioners at 57-58, Maynard v. Cartwright, 108 S. Ct. 1853 (1988) (No. 87-519).
The state agreed that the Supreme Court had approved an even more vague aggravating circum-
stance in the continuing threat standard because it called on juries to predict future conduct.
194. OKLA. UNIF. JURY INsTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL, No. 436 (1981). An Order of the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals effective May 1, 1982, requires trial courts to use the uniform
instructions where applicable. Id. at iv.
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Cartwright does not announce new policy. The decision explains,
but does not expand, the policy in Godfrey. When read with the Tenth
Circuit opinion which it affirms, Cartwright clearly states a policy that
the standards which states adopt to define the "especially heinous" ag-
gravating circumstance must be consistently applied. A state appellate
court must not only compare sentencers' findings of an aggravating cir-
cumstance against some form of standard, but the standard must be
made mandatory.
While refusing to change policy, the Supreme Court has also missed
a chance to address some of the criticized aspects of the aggravating cir-
cumstance "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel," and similar language
in statutes. Vague statutory terms are usually not accidents. They are
written in vague language because public policymakers want a few gen-
eral, catchall aggravating circumstances to make the death penalty avail-
able in cases that do not fit into other categories. As one of the most
critical elements of the Supreme Court's modem death penalty doctrine,
aggravating circumstances will continue to be a focus of creative death
row appeals. Prosecutors searching for a catchall aggravating circum-
stance still can turn to the aggravating circumstance dealing with future
behavior. The reaction to Cartwright and other cases may well be that
legislatures will pass new broad aggravating circumstances.
While Oklahoma finally has a post-Cartwright/Godfrey standard in
place, the standard chosen is as potentially broad as the pre-Cartwright
standard. The broad terms "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" are
being defined by words which could be used to describe any murder.
Because murder implies physical abuse, the new standard also could ap-
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